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I. Introduction 
“The supreme court is a political court.  The discretion that the 
justices exercise can fairly be described as legislative in character, but 
the conditions under which this ‘legislature’ operates is different from 
those of Congress.  Lacking electoral legitimacy, yet wielding Zeus’s 
thunderbolt in the form of the power to invalidate actions of the other 
branches of government as unconstitutional, the justices, to be effective, 
have to accept certain limitations on their legislative discretion. . . . They 
have to be seen to be doing law rather than doing politics.” (Posner, 
2003) 
 
In his incomparable style, Judge Posner describes what is perhaps the issue of most 
interest to scholars in the strategic tradition to judicial decision-making:  under which 
conditions do judges behave more like “legislators” or more like “judges”?  Justices are, 
as Judge Posner says, human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model 
other humans – politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, 
behaving in a  purposive and forward-looking fashion.  The strategic approach, then 
seeks to sort out the various competing interests faced by judges when making decisions. 
In essence, the strategic approach explores the role politics play in judicial decision-
making. In this chapter we provide a brief overview of the strategic approach, offering 
some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-
making. 
II. The Strategic Approach 
A.  Antecedents 
Most of the positive literature on judicial decision-making, to which the strategic 
approach belongs, can be traced back to the work of political scientists such as C. Strategic Judicial Decision Making 
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Herman Pritchett, whose analysis of Supreme Court justices is based on the 
understanding that, at its core, “the essential nature of the task of a Supreme Court 
Justice” is “not unlike that of a Congressman” (Pritchett, 1942, p. 491).  According to 
Pritchett, both politicians and judges decide important public policy issues, formulate 
opinions and issue a vote, enjoying substantial discretion.   In addition the work of 
modern congressional scholars, such as Mayhew (1974), Shepsle and Weingast (1987), 
Weingast and Marshall (1988) among many others, was of critical importance to the early 
development of the strategic approach.  In particular, the concepts of rationality - each 
legislator acts to advance his or her own particular interest - and strategic behavior - 
individuals recognize the interdependency of their actions in a forward looking way – 
was fundamental in further developing Pritchett’s notion of a judge as a politician. . 
B. The First Wave 
It is appropriate to place Marks (1988) as one of the pioneers of the strategic approach to 
judicial decision-making.  Although Marks (1988) does not derive a full-fledged strategic 
framework, he formalizes the effect of constraints imposed on the courts by the 
institution of separation of powers.  Marks focuses on the potential for Congress to 
reverse a judicial decision.  Thus, he looks at the set of conditions under which Congress 
could not modify (reverse) a Court decision.  Following congressional scholars Marks 
also discusses how different institutional arrangements within Congress affect the Court’s 
flexibility to impose its preferred policy alternative.     
  
The strategic approach assumes that judges have a sophisticated understanding of the 
legislative process and of congressional policy preferences  (Gely and Spiller, 1990; Spiller and Gely 
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Eskridge and Ferejohn, 1992).  This assumption provides the strategic approach with the 
ability to provide simple and empirically testable propositions.  A fundamental early 
result of the strategic approach is that, in equilibrium, Congress will tend to acquiesce to 
judicial decisions (Gely and Spiller 1990).  The rationale is simple.  As long as justices’ 
preferences are policy-based, they are better off selecting policy decisions that are 
reversal proof.  
 
<<Insert Figure 1>> 
 
Consider a bargaining framework consisting of three stages, in a political setting such as 
depicted in Figure 1.  In the first stage, an agency interprets a statute.  In the second stage, 
the Court determines the legal status quo.  The final stage consists of bargaining between 
the two chambers of Congress for an alternative policy outcome.  The outcome of the 
final stage is the final policy outcome.  If the House and the Senate agree on an 
alternative to the Court’s policy, then the congressional decision becomes the law.  The 
feasible equilibria to this game comprise the contract set between the House and the 
Senate (i.e., the area between their ideal points). Since the Court anticipates the 
bargaining outcome from any feasible decision, it will make its decision strategically, so 
that the median justice maximizes his or her utility and Congress does not reverse the 
Court.  That is, the Court will pick a policy outcome in the contract curve between the 
House and the Senate.  A decision outside the legislative contract set will trigger a 
legislative bargain with an outcome strictly within the contract set.  So, if the ideal point 
of the median justice is outside the contract set, its optimal decision is the closest Strategic Judicial Decision Making 
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boundary of the contract set.  Thus, under the strategic model, one would expect the 
Supreme Court to hand down only decisions that, in general, Congress and the President 
will not overturn.  That is, justices maximize their utility subject to the constraints 
imposed by the preferences of the relevant political players. In an early survey of 
congressional overrides of Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes, Eskridge 
(1991) finds that in interpreting statutes the Court is more responsive to the expectations 
of the current Congress (as well as the Court’s own preferences) than those of the 
enacting Congress.
   
 
A second type of fundamental result arising from this simple model of strategic judicial 
behavior is that judicial decisions depend on the location of the Court in relation to the 
position of the relevant politicians.  For example, were the Court’s preferences be to the 
right (in a policy line, such as in Figure 1) of the most liberal relevant member of 
Congress, the only relevant political constraint to its decision would be that politician’s 
ideal policy outcome.  Thus, as in the Congressional Dominance Hypothesis (Weingast 
and Moran (1983)), judicial decisions are either unconstrained – when the Court’s 
median justice’s preferences fall within the congressional contract set, or constrained by 
the extreme boundaries of that set.  This finding is methodologically important, because it 
suggests that a linear empirical specification (e.g., a linear regression) will not accurately 
capture the dynamics of the Court – Congress interaction, as the relevant constraint varies 
depending on the relative location of the Court.   
 Spiller and Gely 
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Spiller and Gely (1992) provide the first empirical test of the strategic approach using 
Supreme Court statutory decisions in the area of labor relations.  Like Eskridge, Spiller 
and Gely find that the preferences of both legislators and justices matter.  In particular, 
the manner in which the preferences of the Court and Congress interact is consistent with 
the predictions of the strategic approach.   
 
The topic of statutory interpretation received careful consideration in the earlier years.  
Ferejohn and Weingast (1992a; 1992b), for example, sketch a positive theory of statutory 
interpretation showing the interaction between among the Court, the enacting and future 
legislatures.
1    McNollgast (1992 and 1994) further explore how the organization of 
Congress affects the ability of the Court to act strategically when engaged in statutory 
interpretation; the Court is able strategically to use legislative history to give a statute an 
expansive reading. 
C. The Second Wave  
Over the next several years, scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds 
expanded the focus of the strategic approach in multiple directions.  Spiller and Spitzer 
(1992) analyze the Court’s choice between making a decision on constitutional or non-
constitutional grounds..  Spiller and Spitzer use a strategic representation that includes 
Congress, the courts, the president, the agency and state legislatures to explain the 
Court’s putative reluctance to base its decisions on constitutional grounds.  It is not 
surprising, they conclude, to find that courts are reluctant to use the constitutional 
instrument, because the threat of statutory interpretation is generally sufficient to restrain 
                                                 
1 See also Schwartz, et al (1994) and de Figueiredo, et al (1999) for related, and formal, developments. Strategic Judicial Decision Making 
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agency decisions, and that the Court’s preferences would have to be significantly 
different from those of the political mainstream for a constitutionally restrictive decision 
to constitute equilibrium (Spiller and Spitzer 1992).
    
 
Tiller and Spiller (1999:351) elaborate on the issue of choice of legal rules in analyzing 
why agencies might choose a particular regulatory instrument (e.g., adjudication) over 
another (e.g., rulemaking), and why courts of appeal might reverse agencies by focusing 
on procedural challenges to agency action rather than issues of statutory interpretation.   
They find that by strategically choosing a combination of policy outcomes and regulatory 
instruments, administrative agencies and lower courts impose higher decision costs on the 
reviewing court and thus minimize the chances of reversal.
2 
1 In a related article, Cross 
and Tiller (1998:2159) illustrate the effects of raising decision costs within the context of 
intra-court of appeals panel.  They find that increasing transaction costs forces court of 
appeals panels to act less along ideological or political lines than otherwise they would 
like to.  
 
Spiller and Tiller (1997) look at the power of Congress to change the structure of 
interaction among agencies and the courts, and in so doing, exercise control over policy 
outcomes.  Congress has the ability of influence the judiciary either through the 
manipulation of the decision-making process that the agency must follow (e.g., cost-
benefit analysis) or by changing the standard of review a court must apply when 
reviewing an agency action (e.g., the Bumpers Amendment, 1975) Congress can 
influence the courts by various other means as well.  De Figueiredo and Tiller (1996 and 
                                                 
 Spiller and Gely 
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2000) explore Congress’s ability to influence the federal judiciary through the expansion 
of judgeships; and Toma (1991, 1996) provides evidence that Congress uses the budget 
appropriations as an instrument to signal its preferences to the Supreme Court, similar to 
what it does in its interactions with administrative agencies (Weingast and Moran, 1983).   
 
The strategic approach to the study of judicial behavior, and in particular, to judicial 
independence, outside the U.S. has received substantial recent attention.
3 Spiller (1996) 
developed the basic comparative logic to understand the raise of the doctrine of judicial 
independence.  In environments characterized by a strong and unified polity  - such as in 
two-party parliamentary systems -  attempts to exercise judicial independence will trigger 
political conflict and retaliation. When it is difficult for the polity to overturn or to 
retaliate against the judiciary a doctrine of judicial independence would naturally evolve.    
 
This insight has been applied to a multiplicity of political environments across almost all 
continents. Cooter and Ginsburg (1996), for example, followed this approach by 
examining the impact of political institutions on judicial independence across 21 
countries. Consistent with the basic precepts of the strategic approach, they find that, 
when it is easier for the legislature to override the court and when a “dominant 
disciplined party” controls the governing coalition, the discretion of the courts is limited.  
Epstein et al. (2001) also apply this framework to understand the behavior of European 
Constitutional Courts in their interaction with the relevant political actors.  They analyze, 
for example, why the Russian Constitutional Court’s decisions in the 1992-93 period 
                                                 
3 State Courts have also provided a natural comparative setting for rational choice analyses.  See, for 
example, Spiller and Vanden Bergh (2003) and references therein. Strategic Judicial Decision Making 
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were strategically problematic in entering into conflict with the President. Following this 
early period – and the political retribution inflicted on the Court by President Yeltsin - the 
Court’s decisions were consistent with the expectations of strategic behavior and 
reflected its adaptation to the new political environment. 
 
Garrett et al. (1998) apply the strategic approach to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
The ECJ is in the difficult position of “being seen as enforcing the law impartially by 
following the rules of precedent” and at the same time not making “decisions that litigant 
governments refuse to comply with” (174).  They identify the conditions under which the 
ECJ is more likely to rule against a litigant government and, in turn, those conditions 
when member governments are likely to respond to the ECJ’s rulings. 
 
In his study of three Asian countries Ginsburg (2003) reach similar conclusions.  In the 
context of constitutional design, increased political uncertainty leads to the adoption of 
judicial review as a form of protecting the constitutional bargaining.  In a comparative 
study of Japan and the U.S., Ramseyer (1994) finds that independent courts are likely to 
be supported by elected officials when they believe they are likely to lose in a future 
election.  Under such conditions, it is in the interest of the existing ruling elite to create 
independent courts to protect the policy that has just been enacted into law.  Similarly, 
Ramseyer and Rasmusen (1997, 2006) in studying  judicial independence in Japan 
conclude that, in Japan, politicians seek to achieve the “ideal judge” by exercising more 
control over judges during their careers, rather than at appointment time, finding evidence 
that political bias played a role in the career advancement of judges.   Spiller and Gely 
  10
 
Iaryczower et al. (2002) find that, despite an inhospitable environment, the judiciary in 
Argentina has shown some measure of judicial independence.  Similar to Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen (2006), the authors find that judicial independence depends on the political 
environment, and that in periods with a more fragmented polity, the Court is more willing 
to challenge legislative and executive actions.
4 
III. The Attitudinal Approach 
A. The Basic Hypothesis 
At its most basic level, the attitudinal approach holds that judges decide disputes based 
on their “sincere” ideological preferences and values, unconstrained by outside or inside 
institutions (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 86). Because various institutional devices insulate 
them from outside influences, scholars working within this framework model justices’ 
behavior as influenced by their sincere ideological preferences.
5  Scholars in this tradition 
have provided evidence that both case-facts and justices’ attitudes play a significant role 
in justices’ decisions. Segal and Cover (1989), for example, reports a 80% correlation 
between their measure of justices’ attitudes and their measure of aggregated voting 
tendencies in civil liberties cases (Segal, et al., 1995, extended the study to include 
economic cases), suggesting that attitudes are good predictors of their decisions in the 
two areas that constitute a significant portion of the Supreme Court’s docket (Segal 
1997). 
                                                 
4 See, also, Helmke (2002) for a related result. 
5 Going back to Figure 1 above, the attitudinal approach operates in an environment in which the Court is 
always located within the contract set of the legislature – i.e., the court is always in the political 
mainstream, while the strategic approach becomes relevant when the Court’s preferences deviate from the 
political mainstream.   Strategic Judicial Decision Making 
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B. The Attitudinal and Strategic Approaches Face Each Other 
In a series of papers beginning in the late 1990s scholars in both the strategic and 
attitudinal camps carefully explored the claims made by each model.  Thus, in 1997, 
Segal compared the attitudinal (sincere) and strategic (sophisticated) approaches.   
Although Segal does not reject the strategic account outright, he concludes that the 
evidence unambiguously favors the attitudinal model:   “If the overwhelming majority of 
statistical models find no support for the separations-of-powers  model, if the few 
statistical models supporting the separations-of powers model are seriously flawed, and if 
the model’s foremost advocate [William Eskridge] concludes that the Warren, Burger and 
Rehnquist courts all ignored legislative preferences, there is little need to say more.” 
(2002:349) 
 
Segal and Spaeth, however, go on to say more:  “one might imagine a spectrum along 
which the separation-of-powers model might be relatively true” and “it should hardly be 
surprising that institutional structures matter” (2002:349-50).  These statements are 
interesting because they are consistent with Spiller and Gely (1992) who suggest that 
there are ranges in which the Court is constrain and ranges in which the Court is not, and 
in the latter, thus where the justices are able to impose their own preferences.   
 
In fact, Bergara et al. (2003) apply Spiller and Gely (1992)’s model to Segal’s (1997) 
data.  Consistent with both the attitudinal and strategic approaches, they find that justices’ 
ideologies matter.  Consistent with the strategic approach, they find that the Court is 
often, but not always, constrained by Congress and the extent to which the Court is Spiller and Gely 
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constrained by politics varies significantly over time, a finding consistent with that of 
Rosenberg (1992).   Finally, and also consistent with the strategic model, Bergara et al. 
(2003) find that when the Court is constrained by politics, it seems to respond 
strategically.   The point is, as Jacobi (2006, 265) puts it: “If judges are policy-motivated 
individuals, why would they not pursue those policies in a sophisticated manner?”   
IV. Strategy in the Chambers 
A. Brief Overview  
Another interesting stream is what we call the “Internal Strategic Approach.”  This 
approach focuses on the decision-making process within the Court.
6  Until fairly recently, 
scholars applying strategic models to judicial decision-making have focused primarily on 
the final vote on the case.  With a few exceptions (e.g., Schubert, 1962; Provine, 1982) 
scholars have generally ignored the strategic implications of judicial decisions made prior 
to the final outcome of the case.  Justices can behave strategically at any of the following 
five stages: on certiorari; at the “conference vote,” where a preliminary vote on how the 
case should be decided takes place; in the assignment, by the Chief Justice or by the most 
senior associate justice in the majority, of the writing of the majority opinion; in the 
writing itself, so as to garner majority support; and finally, at the decision to join, concur, 
or dissent.    
 
                                                 
6 The hierarchy of the court has been also extensively analyzed.  For example, Songer et al (1994) analyzed 
the incentives of appeal courts to follow supreme court policies.  Spiller (1992) analyzes agency 
independence given the hierarchy of judicial review.  He shows how the judicial hierarchical process 
further limits agency independence.  The strategic choice of cases has been analyzed by, among others, 
Cameron, et al (2000) and Lax (2002).    Strategic Judicial Decision Making 
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Since justices have the opportunity to engage in strategic behavior at each stage, failure 
to model these stages might result in incomplete understanding of judicial behavior. 
Epstein and Knight (1998, 65) find evidence of strategic behavior at the certiorari stage, 
particularly with the use of the dissent of cert tool.  Modeling yet a different stage, 
Hammond et al (2005) find that, under some conditions, it is optimal for the opinion 
assigner “to assign the opinion to some justice who is not the closest ideologically.” This 
result may explain why Chief Justice Burger systematically assigned opinions to less 
ideologically compatible colleagues.  
B. Strengths 
The Internal Strategic Approach presents a number of exciting opportunities to the study 
of judicial-decision making.  Not only can we focus on the various stages of the internal 
game, but we can also model legal issues and policies.  Lax (2006), for example, has 
transformed Kornhauser’s (1992) mostly normative work on legal rules into analyses of 
doctrine as equilibrium to internal games. Lax (2006) analyzes rule based games, 
showing that equilibrium to rule games have more robust properties than equilibrium to 
policy games. There is always a median rule equilibrium; there may not be a median 
justice.  Doctrine can also be seen as a means of political control, both in the game 
between a Supreme Court and lower courts (Cohen and Spitzer, 1994), or between the 
Court and politicians (Spiller and Spitzer 1995). 
 
Refocusing the discussion on the various stages of decision-making, should motivate the 
collection and codification of new sources of data, such as court’s procedures that, 
although obscure or rarely used (e.g., an order by the Court dismissing a writ of certiorari Spiller and Gely 
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as improvidently granted, i.e., a DIG), may be used by justices in a strategic manner (e.g., 
Solimine and Gely, 2005). 
 
V. The State of the Strategic Approach 
To some extent, we have just started to develop comprehensive, and empirically testable, 
theories of judging (e.g., Hammond et al. 2005).  Although perhaps no model will ever be 
able to capture the complexities of judging the strategic approach, as it has evolved 
provides a useful general framework to study judicial decision-making.   
 
The strategic approach generalizes the attitudinal model.  That there is a range of policy 
over which justices may vote their preferences without the fear of reversal is part of the 
essence of the strategic approach (Spiller and Gely 1992).  It provides room for other 
forces (e.g., judicial norms) to affect judicial decision-making process.  The possibility of 
greater integration between the two approaches is perhaps at its apex now, as scholars 
have began to explore more carefully the internal strategies justices engage in as they 
decide cases.  In particular, it is likely that, in some stages, the justices have more room 
to impose their preferences and in others might be more constraint by political forces.  
Similarly, the type of case (e.g., statutory v. constitutional) might influence the justices’ 
calculus and even within a given type of case, the cases’ salience may affect other 
political actors’ response, and thus the ability of justices to impose their own preferences   
 
In sum, the strategic approach to judicial decision making, rooted in rationality and 
sophistication, is alive and well.  It has evolved from a relatively simple framework to Strategic Judicial Decision Making 
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include concepts such as doctrines, rules, internal decision making, vertical relations 
among levels of the judiciary, and it has traveled overseas and brought back fascinating 
ideas about the impact and growth of judicial institutions.   
 
We have pried open the lid on knowledge about how justices make decisions in the 
United States, at least at the federal level; but we still have very little systematic 
knowledge about their strategic choices in other developed countries and, more 
fundamentally, in emerging and developing economies where institutions are more varied 
and where the impact of institutions on judicial decision-making can sometimes be more 
starkly.   Spiller and Gely 
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